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ABSTRACT
Car sharing represents a promising solution for sustainable transportation. Considering that there
are already many cars that are not used to their full capacity, car sharing communities, whereby a
group of people share access to a car, represent a sustainable alternative. However, sharing a car
within a community results in the challenge of shared contributions and shared requests and
thus, constitutes a social dilemma. From a social dilemma perspective, rational individualistic inter-
ests collide with collective interests of the sharing group: While each member would be better off
contributing as little as possible and using the car as much as possible, it is in the collective inter-
est of the group that each member pays a fair share and uses the resource fairly. This paper ana-
lyzes the problem of contributing to a shared car through the social dilemma framework and
focuses on two potential factors that might influence drivers’ behavior: power (e.g., sanctions,
expertise) and trust mechanisms (i.e., presenting badges) used by the car sharing community. This
paper presents the results of two laboratory experiments. Study 1 (N¼ 183) reveals that power
mechanisms, e.g., sanctions, affect the contribution to a shared car. Study 2 (N¼ 246) replicates
the results of Study 1 and further shows that the presence of a trust mechanism (i.e., badge sys-
tem) shapes the impact of power on contributions. The current research provides valuable insights
for research on car sharing and the sharing economy in general and is particularly relevant for the
constitution of sharing communities.
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1. Introduction
There is a small scale neighborhood-based car sharing
organization in G€oteborg, Sweden called Majorna (Jonsson,
2007). It has 29 cars and about 300 members. The organization
has no employees. Instead, members take turns jointly performing
such tasks as washing and maintaining the cars, IT
programming, and making decisions about insurance, car
replacement, and whether to accept new members.
(Belk, 2014a, p. 8)
This vignette demonstrates an alternative form of transpor-
tation: Instead of everyone owning a car, a group of people
share access to a car via a sharing community. Such car
sharing communities (e.g., 20Minuten, 2016; Hamburger
Abendblatt, 2019; Pomali, 2020) answer the call for more
sustainable mobility solutions.
Even now, humankind has exceeded the ecological limits
of our planet (c.f. Steffen et al., 2015). Over the last decades,
a progressive increase in public concern for ecological sus-
tainability has resulted in a paradigm shift moving pro-
environmental behavior from a fringe to a mainstream issue
(Kalafatis et al., 1999) and fueled the discussion about the
shared usage of resources as a pathway to sustainability (see
discussion on the sharing economy by Heinrichs, 2013).
Mobility is one of the three areas accounting for most of the
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide (Hertwich & Peters,
2009). One initiative that plays an important role in reduc-
ing exhaust gases and pollution is the shared usage of cars
(c.f. Hamari et al., 2016; Pizzol et al., 2017). Private car shar-
ing represents a more sustainable alternative as the majority
of private vehicles are not used to their full capacity. Data in
2014 show that the average parking time per day was
22 hours (see survey results in six European countries,
Pasaoglu et al., 2014) and in 2018, people spent on average
around an hour a day traveling in Great Britain, including
only 36minutes by car (as a driver or passenger)
(Department for Transport, 2019). This constitutes a
resource saving potential that could be exploited through
higher adoption rates of car sharing.
Private car sharing can be organized via sharing com-
munities, whereby a group of people share access to a car,
which is owned by the community. This is illustrated by the
vignette at the beginning of the article, which portrays a
“sharing community” for cars. Relating to the definition of a
community-based economy as part of the sharing economy
by Acquier et al. (2017), we define a car sharing community
as a group of people whose members grant each other access
to underutilized cars, whereby all community members are
responsible for organization and maintenance of the shared
CONTACT Barbara Hartl barbara.hartl@wu.ac.at Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, Vienna 1020, Austria.
 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/),
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/15568318.2021.1912224
car and thus, have to contribute physical and financial
resources to ensure the maintenance of the shared car.
Sharing a car within a community allows private individ-
uals to benefit from having a car without the same costs and
responsibilities of individual car ownership. However, shar-
ing a car within a community results in the challenge of
shared contributions and shared requests and thus, consti-
tutes a social dilemma: First, all group members should con-
tribute to the shared car, for instance, by paying into a fund
for maintenance or by washing the car, as well as keeping it
clean or refueled so the next driver can use it. Financial
contributions might be organized via an informal member-
ship fee or on a voluntary basis, but most of the time, the
members decide alone and without constraints about their
actual contribution to the shared car. For the whole commu-
nity it would be best if all members contribute a certain
share consistently and in equal measure in order to be able
to provide the service. However, some members of the shar-
ing group might take advantage of it by contributing less
than required, e.g., by not refueling the car.
Second, the group members cannot decide when to use
the car independent of each other. In car sharing commun-
ities, a certain number of people share access to the same
car, thus, they have to coordinate the usage of this car.
Sharing a car within a community is only sustainable if all
group members contribute enough to ensure the mainten-
ance of the car and the sum of all members’ requests of
using the car do not exceed a certain limit. Thus, sharing a
car within a community represents a social dilemma.
According to Dawes (1980), a social dilemma is defined as a
situation in which a person profits from selfish behavior
(e.g., by not contributing to a shared good), unless too
many people in the community decide to behave selfishly, in
which case the whole community loses (e.g., as the shared
good can no longer be provided). In case of community car
sharing, contributing to the shared car (e.g., maintenance) is
costly to the individual, but helps all drivers (c.f. Cubitt
et al., 2011) and ensures sustainable consumption of the
good. If too many drivers decide to defect and free ride, the
shared car can no longer be provided, and therefore every-
one in the car sharing community is worse off.
Drawing on the discussion above, the question arises as
to how car sharing within a community should be organized
to guarantee that everyone is contributing enough to the
shared car so that the car sharing community represents a
sustainable traffic solution. The main objective of the cur-
rent article is thus to investigate the social dilemma of car
sharing, building on psychological research that has identi-
fied power (e.g., sanctions for misbehavior) and trust (e.g.,
badge system) as drivers of contribution. Although previous
research has contributed to deepening the knowledge of
trust in the sharing economy (e.g., Celata et al., 2017; Cheng
et al., 2020; Ert et al., 2016; Ooi et al., 2003), most of the
existing research has examined B2C or P2P (i.e., consumers
lend out their cars to each other via a mediating platform)
sharing models, not differentiating between different forms
of power and trust. In their comparison of the perception of
B2C and community sharing models, Hofmann et al. (2017)
argue that in cases when communities do not wield any
type of power and, additionally, consumers hold very low
trust, the communities will quickly collapse because no force
is present to hold the community together. We apply the
social dilemma theory (Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998; Zeng &
Chen, 2003) to study the impact of power and trust on com-
munity car sharing and aim to investigate power and trust
as key mechanisms to foster contribution to a shared car.
2. Theoretical background
In the following, we describe car sharing and define car
sharing communities, before we frame car sharing as a social
dilemma and review literature on power and trust as impact
factors on cooperative behavior.
The current article builds on the definitions of Nobis
(2006) and Katzev (2003) and defines car sharing as a ser-
vice that enables a group of people to share access to a car
with others. Car sharing represents a very successful busi-
ness idea: Related to the growing sharing economy (e.g.,
Cheng et al., 2020), car sharing has gained considerable
popularity in North America and Europe over the past deca-
des. In 2010, car sharing services were offered on five conti-
nents (Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, and South
America) (Shaheen & Cohen, 2013). The most prominent
examples of car sharing are world-wide companies offering
car sharing services, like zipcar (Duncan, 2011;
Sundararajan, 2013), DriveNow (Kopp et al., 2015;
Miramontes et al., 2017), or car2go (Namazu et al., 2018).
Such car sharing providers enable consumers to access a
vehicle for short-term daily use (Shaheen et al., 2012),
whereby the cars are owned by the company (business-to-
consumer (B2C); Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014; Lamberton &
Rose, 2012). However, the potential to solve the problem of
an overcrowded city is limited, as additional cars from dif-
ferent car sharing companies may not reduce the usage of
cars at all. The current research thus focuses on car sharing
communities in contrast to previous research on B2C car
sharing offers. We define car sharing communities as a com-
munity that shares the following characteristics: (1) mem-
bers of a community have access to a commonly shared car
for their own use; (2) members contribute to the community
car with financial or physical resources, (3) members request
the usage of the shared car, and (4) use the car for a limited
time period (c.f. Hofmann et al., 2017). Excluded from the
definition is the shared use of vehicles in arrangements such
as carpooling, ridesharing services (Shoshany Tavory et al.,
2020), or taxi services like Uber (Ravenelle, 2017), as the
relationship with fellow drivers in car sharing services differs
distinctly from those in ridesharing services. In contrast to
those services, car sharing drivers have to behave decently
when driving the car themselves and contribute to the car’s
maintenance.
2.1. Car sharing as a social dilemma
Participating in a car sharing community can be conceptual-
ized as a social dilemma (c.f. Dawes, 1980). The community
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shares a resource, i.e., a car, and the members need to con-
tribute to the shared car (e.g., pay a monthly fee or refuel
the car) so that the community can maintain the resource.
From a social dilemma perspective, rational individualistic
interests collide here with collective interests: While each
member would be better off contributing as little as possible
and using the car as much as possible, it is in the collective
interest of the group that each member pays a fair share
and uses the resource fairly (Hofmann et al., 2019).
Some research on social dilemmas distinguishes between
give-some (GS) dilemmas and take-some (TS) dilemmas, as
well as the hybrid of both dilemmas, the give-or-take-some
(GOTS) dilemma (Budescu & McCarter, 2012). In GS
dilemmas, people decide whether they withhold resources
for private use or give resources to contribute to a shared
good. In contrast, TS dilemmas capture consumption from a
shared resource (Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000): People can
decide how much they consume a shared resource and thus,
whether they refrain from overconsuming or not. Car shar-
ing can be described as a GOTS dilemma, as members of a
sharing community on the one hand decide how much they
are willing to give, i.e., contribute, to maintain the shared
car and on the other hand, how much they want to take,
and thus, consume the car.
Not every member of the car sharing community sticks
to the rules and brings the car back in good condition and
at the agreed time. They exploit the community by overus-
ing the good or by preventing further usage by other mem-
bers, request a car more than they contribute and thus,
freeride in the social dilemma (c.f. Marwell & Ames, 1981).
Research on social dilemma has identified both power
mechanisms, in terms of sanctioning and control, and trust
as drivers of contributing to a shared good (c.f. Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2005; Mulder et al., 2006). Likewise, in
the sharing economy, power measures are discussed to
ensure appropriate conduct and contribution (Hofmann
et al., 2017; Jiang & Tian, 2015; Schor & Fritzmaurice,
2015), supplementing trust (Belk, 2014b; Ert et al., 2016; Ert
& Fleischer, 2019).
2.2. Power
The execution of power, especially in terms of sanctions, has
received much attention across disciplines (e.g., Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004; Gurerk et al., 2006). Power is defined as
the potential and perceived ability of a party to influence
another party’s behavior (c.f. French & Raven, 1959; Gangl
et al., 2015). Netter et al. (2019) stress that monitoring and
sanctions represent core organizational characteristics of
sharing models and point out that sanctions can be an
approach to coercing members to do what they are expected
to do. Notably, the influence of power mechanisms is a rela-
tively new topic in the context of car sharing. Research on
B2C car sharing as well as research on sharing communities
suggest that power can enhance contributions within a car
sharing community. A study on B2C car sharing by Bardhi
and Eckhardt (2012) revealed that consumers evaluate moni-
toring positively as they expect others to act
opportunistically, e.g., not giving a GPS receiver that they
found in the car to the lost and found. Research on commu-
nity sharing tools (Hartl et al., 2016) and community gar-
dens (Tidball & Krasny, 2007) further underlines the
importance of sanctions and control mechanisms to ensure
that all sharers follow the rules within the shar-
ing community.
To extend previous research on power and sharing, we
adopt the theory of the bases of social power and distinguish
between influence through coercion and influence through
legitimation, expertise, information allocation and identifica-
tion processes (c.f. Gangl et al., 2015; Raven, 1993; Raven
et al., 1998). Thus, on the one hand, car sharing commun-
ities can apply coercive power by announcing sanctions,
such as a fine or even exclusion from the sharing commu-
nity. On the other hand, sharing communities can rely on
their expertise and give information on how to behave prop-
erly (legitimate power). Both coercive and legitimate power
have proven to promote contribution to a public good and
reduce exploitation in different contexts (e.g., Hartl et al.,
2015). Based on the above theoretical background, the cur-
rent article tests the following hypotheses:
H1a: Regulating car sharing using coercive power enhances
cooperation (i.e., contribution and request) within a car-
sharing community.
H1b: Regulating car sharing using legitimate power enhances
cooperation (i.e., contribution and request) within a car-
sharing community.
2.3. Trust
Trust plays a key role in social interactions. To trust someone
is widely defined as being “vulnerable to the actions of
another party based on the expectation that the other will per-
form a particular action important to the trustor” (Mayer
et al., 1995, p. 712). Accordingly, trust has been identified as
an important mechanism to resolve social dilemmas (Van
Lange et al., 2017), as well as an important concept in research
on the sharing economy (Cheng et al., 2020; Hua et al., 2020).
In the current research, we follow the often used distinc-
tion between trust based on rational cognitive processes and
trust based on automatic-affective processes (c.f. Lewis &
Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Tyler, 2003) by drawing on
the conceptualization of trust by Castelfranchi and Falcone
(2010), differentiating between reason-based trust and impli-
cit trust. Reason-based trust is based on rational considera-
tions according to the following criteria: shared goals,
dependency, internal factors, and external factors
(Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). Thus, members of a car
sharing community trust the community if they have the
feeling that they pursue the same goal, e.g., ensuring sustain-
able transportation. Further, they trust if they depend on the
community or perceive the others as competent, willing and
harmless (internal factors). Moreover, external factors, such
as other institutions that provide the sharing community
with the opportunity to fulfill its goals (e.g., the legal possi-
bility to buy a community car), lead to trust.
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Implicit trust, on the other hand, is defined as an unin-
tentional, automatic reaction originating from associative
and conditioned learning processes (Castelfranchi &
Falcone, 2010). Implicit trust might be activated by cues,
e.g., such as trusting the tax authority as it represents an
official institution (c.f. Gangl et al., 2015). Both reason-based
and implicit trust are important in the context of sharing: If
members of a sharing community do not trust others to
contribute their share, they might reduce their own contri-
butions to the group to avoid playing the “sucker” (Kerr,
1983), i.e., carrying free riders. On the other hand, the more
members of a sharing community trust the community to
contribute fairly, the more they are willing to contrib-
ute themselves.
H2a: Trust in the community shapes cooperation (i.e.,
contribution and request) within a car-sharing community
additionally to the application of power.
When organizing car sharing, communities might establish
cues that enhance trust. In the current research, we argue that
presenting badges that symbolize that members behaved
cooperatively in the past can act as a cue to initiate implicit
trust, following Ert and Fleischer (2020, p. 630) who describe
the “Airbnb certification system (the “Superhost” badge) as
yet another important trust cue in the market”. Building on
literature on cues (Riegelsberger, 2003; Tanner & Maeng,
2012), labels (Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014; Tonkin et al.,
2016), and awards as signals of otherwise unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics (Frey & Neckermann, 2010), we argue
that badges, which are presented to make past desired behav-
ior visible, act as a cue to trust the person, i.e., one can expect
the person to contribute in the future. The current research
focuses on badge systems because they are well known meas-
ures applied to encourage desirable behavior (i.e., contribu-
tion to a shared good) among users of P2P platforms
(Teubner et al., 2017). For instance, AirBnB awards hosts with
a “superhosts” badge if they meet particular benchmarks
specified by the platform (i.e., high response rate, consistent
5-star evaluations, a certain number of bookings per year, and
rarely canceled confirmed reservations) (Hamari, 2017;
Teubner et al., 2017). Badge systems can be easily imple-
mented in car sharing communities as well, e.g., by placing a
badge next to the name on a newsletter, signing list, or other
form of listing of the community’s members. Notably, as shar-
ing communities differ from P2P sharing in important charac-
teristics, e.g., as members of a sharing community are all
providers and users of the shared good at the same time,
badge systems might affect cooperation differently. Therefore,
the effect of a badge system in a sharing community is par-
ticularly examined in the present study.
H2b: The application of badge systems enhance contribution to
a shared car.
2.4. Overview of studies
In the following, we present two laboratory experiments to
test the stated hypotheses on the impact of power and trust.
Experiments represent an ideal method for studying social
dilemmas (c.f. Van Lange et al., 2013) and have already
been successfully applied to study drivers’ behavior (Fujii,
2010; Sunitiyoso et al., 2011). The following experiments
were designed in a way that they allow us to specifically
analyze the situation of sharing a car within a community:
Within a car sharing community, drivers have to decide
how much they want to give, i.e., contribution to the shared
car, and how much they want to take, i.e., requested hours
of using the shared car. For this purpose, we adapted a give-
or-take-some game (GOTS-game) in Study 1 (Budescu &
McCarter, 2012; McCarter et al., 2011): In a GOTS game, a
group of participants decide in a first stage, individually,
how much they would want to contribute to a shared pool
(“give-some”) and in a second stage, how much they would
want to request from the shared pool (“take-some”). In
Study 1, participants were invited to a laboratory, were ran-
domly assigned to groups of car sharers and individually
decided via computer how much they wanted to contribute
to the shared car and for how many hours they would
request it. By applying a GOTS game Study 1 meets the call
for more empirical research examining hybrid social dilem-
mas between take-some and give-some dilemmas (Budescu
& McCarter, 2012; McCarter et al., 2011).
Study 2 builds on the results of Study 1 and focuses pri-
marily on the impact of a badge system on the contribution
to a shared car. Therefore, the study focuses only on the
“give-some” stage and follows a public good game
(Fischbacher et al., 2001). In this game, a group of partici-
pants decide how much from their endowment they want to
contribute to a public good. Thus, in Study 2 participants
were invited to the laboratory and individually decided how
much they wanted to contribute to a shared car via a com-
puter screen.
Both studies extend previous research in several ways:
First, since the sharing economy is a relatively new phenom-
enon with an enormous potential, there is a strong need to
investigate advantages and disadvantages of the sharing
economy. The current research addresses this research gap
by investigating the problem of contribution to a shared
good, focusing on power and trust in the sharing economy.
In order to gain new insights into the sharing economy, the
current research draws on empirical evidence from the
social dilemma theory.
Second, the current research demonstrates the use of a
laboratory experiment for investigating the dilemma of con-
tributions to a shared car. A fictitious car sharing commu-
nity is used in the experiment. Notably, in the current
studies participants were remunerated according to their
decision in the experiment; thus, their behavior in the
experiment, i.e., how much they contributed to the shared
car and how much they requested to use the shared car, had
an impact on their financial outcome.
Finally, the current studies contribute to research on trust
in car sharing by investigating the effect of a trust measure,
i.e., a badge system on contribution to a shared community
car. Although sharing platforms often install badge systems
in addition to review systems, social science research has
focused primarily on the latter (e.g., Ert et al., 2016) and has
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not examined the effect of badge systems on behavior within
sharing communities.
2.4.1. Ethic statement
All studies reported here were conducted in respect to the
Declaration of Helsinki (revised 1983) and local guidelines
of the Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna. The
studies are part of a project proposal approved by two inter-
national scientific peer-reviewers from the field for the
Austrian Science Fund (FWF; Grant number P29693-G29).
Both reviewers stated that the project does not give rise to
any ethical issues. According to the Austrian Universities
Act 2002 (UG2002), only medical universities are required
to appoint ethics committees if undertaking medical
research. Therefore, no ethical approval from another ethics
committee was required for the present studies. For the cur-
rent studies, the majority of participants are part of a
research subject pool and recruited via an online data bank
of the Department of Applied Psychology, for which they
had to provide their written consent to be contacted for par-
ticipating in research studies. All participants were invited
to the laboratory of the Faculty and gave their verbal con-
sent to participate in the study. Information about the dur-
ation, the tasks, the payment, and the confidentiality was
provided to participants prior to the studies. All participants
voluntarily took part in the studies and could withdraw at
any time with no consequences. The data was collected




Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis through
leaflets as well as word of mouth. A total of 183 individuals
(71.6% women; Mage ¼ 25.56, SDage ¼ 6.32) participated. Of
these, the majority of participants (82.5%) reported earnings
of less than 1,000 Euro per month, and about a third of the
participants had a university degree (36.1%), whereas 61.7%
had a high school degree, and 2.1% had other degrees.
Forty-three percent of the participants reported having
experience with the sharing economy.
3.1.2. Experimental design and procedure
In order to test the hypotheses regarding whether power
impacts contribution to car sharing, an experiment was built
on a GOTS-game (McCarter et al., 2011) in which partici-
pants paid for a shared car (Give-Some) that could be con-
sumed in a second step, according to registered requests of
car usage (hours of car use) (Take-Some). The hours of car
usage depended on the sum of contributions from all mem-
bers of the car sharing community. If the contributions are
enough to meet the requests, a common bonus is provided
(McCarter et al., 2011).
In the experiment, the described power of the community
organizing the shared car varied, resulting in a 2 (low vs.
high coercive power) x 2 (low vs. high legitimate power)
between subjects design, conducted with the software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The rules presented clearly how contri-
butions (Give-Some) and requests (Take-Some) work in the
community and what the consequences of exploitation are.
In a laboratory experiment, over ten rounds, they contrib-
uted to a fictitious, shared car and were then able to use
this fictitious, shared car.
3.1.2.1. Procedure. The graphical display of the procedure
can be found in Figure 1. All participants were asked to
imagine living in a building with up to 20 flats, whereby the
other participants represent residents from the other flats.
They were informed that at a meeting, all residents decided
to buy several community cars for the house community,
which would be financed jointly and available for use for all
residents. Weekly payments would cover the repayment of
acquisition costs, insurance costs and necessary repairs.
Everyone can use the community cars, but everyone is also
responsible for maintenance. The service is organized
weekly; the car is available from Monday to Thursday.
Figure 1. Study 1: Graphical display of the procedure.
Note. MC¼manipulation check; P¼ predictor; CV¼ control variable.
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Everyone can only book one community car. This commu-
nity car is shared every week anonymously with three other,
randomly selected members of the house community.
After this introduction to the experiment (see Figure 1), par-
ticipants received one of four versions of the following vignette
(combining low and high coercive power and low and high
legitimate power):
The rules for the usage of the car were developed and set
up by a small part/all of the residents. In a community meet-
ing it was decided that the observance of the rules of use in
the community are rarely/frequently monitored. The commu-
nity meets rarely/frequently to discuss emerging issues and
problems. Persons who do not follow or violate the rules of
use will be leniently/severely punished by the community. The
community has obviously thought very little/carefully about
how the usage of the community cars can function optimally.
If users violate the rules for the eleventh time, they do not
even/in any case have to expect to be excluded by the commu-
nity. The community designs the use in a way that the resi-
dents hardly/completely feel that they belong to the house
community. Whether the rules of use for the community cars
are respected is seldom/frequently checked.
In order to ensure that participants understood the rules of
the experiment, we included a pay-off calculation example in
the instruction (see Figure 1). Participants had to answer
questions according to the example and to calculate the over-
all gain in the particular situation. Participants than contrib-
uted in ten rounds to a fictitious, shared car (“Please enter
how much you pay for the use of the community car this
round”), received the information of the sum of all contribu-
tions and were then able to make an request for using the
shared car (“Please enter how many hours you want to use the
community car or reserve it for yourself”). All participants took
actions privately, anonymously and without communicating
with the other participants. . If the sum of the four requests
from the shared car did not exceed the sum of all four contri-
butions to the shared car, then the participants received what
they had requested and additionally also a bonus of 75% of
the sum of the contributions. If the request of all four partici-
pants was higher than the sum of the contributions, then the
participants did not receive their request or a bonus and what
they had contributed was lost for the participants.
After the experimental part, participants had to fill in a
questionnaire. As a manipulation check, we asked about par-
ticipants’ perceptions of the community’s coercive power
(four items; e.g., “The community enforces its claims using
controls and punishment”) and legitimate power (22 items;
e.g., “The community is valued by the members for
their work”).
Further, we measured participants’ implicit trust (e.g., “I
trust the community in most cases automatically”) and rea-
son based trust (e.g., “I trust the community because their
goals seem plausible to me”) in the community to examine
interaction climate (e.g., “The climate within the community
is characterized by mutual trust”). The perception of power,
as well as trust was assessed using scales from Hofmann
et al. (2017).
In addition, we measured several control variables:
Participants answered scales on environmental consciousness
(10 items; e.g., “I always advise others to keep the environ-
ment clean”) and green consumerism (12 items; e.g., “I drive
my car within speed limits to rationalize petrol con-
sumption.”, Alsmadi, 2007), risk-seeking (6 items; e.g., “I
enjoy being reckless,” Colquitt et al., 2006), trustfulness (4
items; e.g., “I trust in what people say.”, adapted from
Cattell, 2001), and affiliation (9 items; “Just being around
others and finding out about them is one of the most inter-
esting things I can think of doing,” Hill, 1987).
All responses were indicated on a seven-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (‘I totally disagree’) to 7 (‘I totally agree’).
Cronbach’s a of all scales were satisfying (a ranging between
.79 and .94).
The experiment lasted on average 45minutes and, at the
end of the experiment, participants were remunerated based
on their behavior (participants received on average 6.03
EUR (SD ¼ 3.77) or 6.64 USD (SD ¼ 4.15), respectively).
The participants’ payoffs in the experiment were calculated
on the basis of the contributions and requests, and the
points earned in a randomly chosen round were converted
to Euros.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Preliminary data analyses
To check whether the manipulation of intensity of coercive
power and legitimate power was successful, a MANOVA was
performed. The results showed that the manipulation was suc-
cessful as low (cplow) and high (cphigh) levels of coercive power
(p < .001, gp
2¼ .27; cplow: M¼ 2.12, SD¼ 1.22; cphigh:
M¼ 3.90, SD¼ 1.76) and low (lplow) and high (lphigh) levels of
legitimate power were in line with the manipulation (p ¼ .001,
gp
2¼ .06; lplow: M¼ 3.80, SD¼ 1.19; lphigh: M¼ 4.41,
SD¼ 1.18). The manipulation of coercive power had no signifi-
cant effect on the perception of legitimate power (p ¼ .16) and
the manipulation of legitimate power had no significant effect
on the perception of coercive power (p¼ .16).
3.2.2. Contribution. To test whether coercive and legitimate
power (H 1) as well as trust (H 2a) impacts contribution to
the shared car, a repeated measure regression is conducted
Table 1. Summary of regression analyses predicting contribution and request
within a car sharing community.
Contribution Request
Predictors b P b p
Legitimate power .05 .359 .014 .775
Coercive power .16 .004 –.035 .462
LPxCP –.13 .013 .010 .842
Implicit trust .01 .810 .090 .086
Reason-based trust .00 .946 –.046 .384
Control variables
Environmental Consciousness .28 <.001 .053 .504
Green consumerism –.13 .043 –.019 .760
Risk seeking –.04 .503 .047 .356
Trustfulness .11 .039 .071 .272
Affiliation .02 .788 –.054 .312
Experience –.01 .868 –.043 .343
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Figure 2. Study 1: Contribution (in percentage of the endowment) for the four conditions over the ten rounds.
Note. CP¼ coercive power; LP¼ legitimate power.
Figure 3. Study 1: Requests (in percentage of the shared pool) for the four conditions over the ten rounds.
Note. CP¼ coercive power; LP¼ legitimate power.
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using STATA with the manipulation of power as a predictor
variable and ten rounds of contribution as the dependent
variable, additionally controlling for reported trust, values,
environmental consciousness, risk seeking, and collaborative
consumption experience, F(11, 182) ¼ 6.08, p < .001,
R2 ¼ .14 (see Table 1).
The analysis reveals a significant main effect of coercive
power, b ¼ .16, t(182) ¼ 2.93, p ¼ .004, and a significant
interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power, b ¼
.13, t(182) ¼ 2.51, p ¼ .013, but no significant main
effect of legitimate power (p ¼ .359). The results show that
low coercive and low legitimate power resulted in the lowest
level of contribution (see Figure 2). Concerning trust, the
analysis revealed that neither reported reason-based trust
nor reported implicit trust are related to the contributions
(p > .576).
3.2.3. Requests. To test whether the manipulation of coer-
cive and legitimate power and trust are related to the
requests for using the shared car, again, a repeated measure
regression was conducted using STATA, F(11, 182) ¼ 0.56,
p ¼ .856, R2 ¼ .01. The analysis reveals no significant main
effect of coercive power (p ¼ .462) or legitimate power (p ¼
.775) and no significant interaction effect (p ¼ .842). The
analysis reveals a tendency of implicit trust, b ¼ .08, t(182)
¼ 1.73, p ¼ .086. Figure 3 shows that over the ten rounds,
participants in every condition requested around 25 percent
of the available hours of the shared car.
Study 1 shows that the manipulation of a car sharing
community organization as wielding coercive and legitimate
power impacts contributions to the shared car. Requests
were not affected by power, but the results show a tendency
for implicit trust to be related to the requests. Building on
the results of Study 1, Study 2 aims to further develop the
relationship between power and trust in car sharing by pro-
viding information in the public goods game similar to a
badge system on sharing platforms and, thus, further exam-





Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis through
leaflets as well as word of mouth. A total of 246 individuals
(61.8% women; Mage ¼ 24.73, SDage ¼ 5.96) participated. Of
these, the majority of participants were employed (59.8%),
with 82.6% reporting earnings of less than 1,000 Euro per
month. About a third of the participants had a university
degree (27.6%) and 69.5% had a high school degree. Half of
the participants (51.2%) reported having experience with the
sharing economy.
4.1.2. Experimental design and procedure
Again, participants took part in a laboratory experiment and
contributed to a fictitious, shared car over eleven rounds
(the first round was a training round and not part of the
analysis). The base of Study 2 was built on a public good
game, which is a classic laboratory paradigm for studying
collective action problems (e.g., Rand et al., 2009). For an
overview of the experimental procedure see Figure 4.
In the experiment, the actual amount of contributions
were doubled and benefits were returned to all participants
equally. Again, coercive and legitimate power of the
Figure 4. Study 2: Graphical display of the procedure.
Note. MC¼manipulation check; P¼ predictor; CV¼ control variable.
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organizing community varied. Additionally, a badge system
was implemented for half of the participants, resulting in a
2 (low vs. high coercive power) x 2 (low vs. high legitimate
power) x 2 (badge system vs. no badge system) design. In
the “badge system” condition, participants received informa-
tion about the group members they would share a car with
in this round. The information was based on group mem-
bers’ contribution in the last round. Please note that they
received past information on group members that they had
probably not interacted with in the previous round. Thus,
before the next round started, participants received informa-
tion on which of the others had contributed more than 50%
of their endowment in the last round. The information was
given by placing a star next to the number of the
participant.
The experiment was conducted via z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007). This time, participants did not receive a calculation
example, but an additional first round was introduced in
order to ensure the understanding of the experiment. This
additional round was not taken into consideration for data
analysis. Altogether, the participants played eleven rounds.
All participants took actions privately, anonymously and
without communicating with the other participants. The
experiment lasted on average 40minutes and at the end of
the experiment participants were remunerated based on
their behavior (participants received on average 9.46 EUR
(SD ¼ 1.86)).
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Preliminary data analyses
Again, to check whether the manipulation of intensity of
coercive power and legitimate power was successful, a
MANOVA was performed. The results showed that the
manipulation was successful as low (cplow) and high (cphigh)
levels of coercive power (p < .001, gp
2¼ .29; cplow:
M¼ 1.98, SD¼ 1.19; cphigh: M¼ 3.88, SD¼ 1.76) and low
(lplow) and high (lphigh) levels of legitimate power were in
line with the manipulation (p < .001, gp
2¼ .17; lplow:
M¼ 3.44, SD¼ 1.13; lphigh: M¼ 4.43, SD¼ 1.04). The
manipulation of coercive power had no significant effect on
the perception of legitimate power (p ¼ .91) and the
manipulation of legitimate power had no significant effect
on the perception of coercive power (p ¼ .41).
4.2.2. Contribution
To test whether coercive and legitimate power and the
badge system impact contributions, a repeated measure
regression was conducted using STATA, with the manipula-
tion of coercive power, legitimate power and badge system
as predictor variables and ten rounds of contribution as the
dependent variable, additionally controlling for trust, values,
environmental consciousness, risk seeking and collaborative
consumption experience, F(15, 245) ¼ 4.19, p < .001,
R2 ¼ .10 (see Table 2).
The analysis reveals a significant main effect of coercive
power, b ¼ .09, t(245) ¼ 2.15, p ¼ .032 and significant
three-way interaction effect of the badge system, coercive
and legitimate power, b ¼ .13, t(245) ¼ 2.94, p ¼ .004,
but no significant main effect of legitimate power (p ¼
.398), of the badge system (p ¼ .453) or other significant
interactions (p’s > .367). The three-way interaction effect of
the badge system, coercive and legitimate power can be
interpreted as follows: The means of contribution over all
rounds reveal that when a badge system is not present, the
combination of high coercive and high legitimate power
results in the highest level of contributions. Thus, the higher
the coercive power and at the same time the higher the
legitimate power that is wielded, the more participants con-
tributed to the shared car. In case a badge system is present,
it is not necessarily the combination of high coercive and
high legitimate power that results in the highest level of con-
tribution: Participants contribute more if either coercive or
legitimate power is high.
Thus, the badge system shaped the effect of power on
contributions (see Figure 5).
Study 2 confirms the result of Study 1 showing that
applying power impacts contribution to a shared car.
Further, results show that the presence of a badge system
shapes the impact of coercive and legitimate power. In the
“badge system”-condition in Study 2, the information about
participants’ past contribution was displayed in terms of the
presence or absence of a “badge”, i.e., a star next to the par-
ticipation number. In a public good game, in which individ-
uals are only able to vary their amount of contribution, but
not their requests, a badge system displays whether one
behaves in favor of the community.
5. Discussion
New concepts of sharing are on the rise, triggered by the
economic crises and increased environmental awareness and
facilitated by a number of developments, which simplified
sharing of goods with others (Hamari et al., 2016; Hua
et al., 2020; Sundararajan, 2013; Tussyadiah & Pesonen,
2016). The current study addresses the issue of cooperation
within car sharing communities, which have recently gained
popularity (e.g., 20Minuten, 2016; Hamburger Abendblatt,
2019; Pomali, 2020).
The fact that some members within the community
might not cooperate is an important issue for car sharing
communities. Whether drivers benefit from sharing a car
depends on the proper behavior of all users of the shared
car, and thus, introduces a social dilemma (Budescu &
McCarter, 2012). We apply the classical approach of the
social dilemma theory to investigate the phenomenon of car
sharing within a community. Two laboratory experiments
showed that organizing car sharing using coercive or legit-
imate power mechanisms has an effect on the contribution
to a shared car. This result is in line with previous research
showing that sanctions were enforced on misbehavior, e.g.,
in free-floating bike sharing (Ma et al., 2018), and supports
the assumption that monitoring and control mechanisms are
important organizational characteristics of sharing models
(Netter et al., 2019).
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Further, Study 1 contributed to a better understanding of
the dynamic of giving and taking by showing that the
requests to use the car are not influenced by the experimen-
tal manipulation in contrast to the contributions.
Participants in every condition requested around 25 percent
of the shared pool, which may indicate that when it comes
to actually dividing the shared resource participants act
according to the equality principle. The equality principle
(Jap, 2001) specifies that each party receives an equal share
of the payoffs independently of the contribution (i.e., every
user of the shared car can use the car for the same amount
of hours independent of her/his contribution), compared to
the equity principle, which states that the payoff of the
members should be related to their contribution.
As badge systems are used in sharing activities as trust
cues (Ert & Fleischer, 2020), Study 2 additionally investi-
gated the impact of badge systems on car sharing. The
results show that if sharing economy activities are organized
using different power mechanisms, a badge system inform-
ing about past behavior shapes the effect of power mecha-
nisms on contributions. Although similar badge systems
informing about past behavior have already been imple-
mented in P2P platforms, the results are of particular
important as characteristics of sharing communities differ
from P2P platforms: Sometimes it is easier within a commu-
nity to identify how much an individual has contributed to
the shared car (e.g., in the case of monetary payment to the
community budget) and sometimes it is harder to trace the
Figure 5. (a) Study 2: Contribution (in percentage of the endowment) for the four conditions in the reputation condition over the ten rounds. (b) Study 2:
Contribution (in percentage of the endowment) for the four conditions in the no-reputation condition over the ten rounds.
Note. CP¼ coercive power; LP¼ legitimate power.
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contributions back to individual members of the group (e.g.,
in the case of car maintenance, such as washing a car).
Moreover, on a P2P platform, people can choose from dif-
ferent private car providers and may use a badge system to
decide which provider to trust. In car sharing communities,
members cannot choose between different providers of cars.
A badge system in car sharing communities therefore does
not help to identify a transaction partner, but members
might base their decision on how much to contribute to the
shared car on this information.
5.1. Theoretical implications
To the authors’ knowledge, the problem of joint contribu-
tions and the application of power in car sharing commun-
ities have not been explored much in experiments. However,
precious research has demonstrated that laboratory experi-
ments provide valuable insights into traveler’s behavior
(Sunitiyoso et al., 2011). The current studies support this
research by underlining that evidence and methods from
social dilemma research can serve as a base for research on
the sharing economy. Complementing the research on shar-
ing economy using economic experiments, future research
should continue to actively apply social dilemma insights to
understand how the organization of groups can impact con-
tributions in consumer decisions.
In the current research, we discuss a badge system as a
cue for trust, building on past research on labels and certifi-
cations (Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014; Frey & Neckermann,
2010; Riegelsberger, 2003; Tanner & Maeng, 2012; Tonkin
et al., 2016). In Study 2, participants received information
on whether the other community members earned a badge
before they made their decision on how much they wanted
to contribute. The information was anonymous; thus, the
participants only knew that they would be sharing the car
with three other members and received information on how
many of those had earned a badge. A badge system may
shape contribution to a shared good in several ways: First,
one gets information about the behavior of others and if
they contributed much in the past, the risk of engaging in
car sharing together with the other group members is lower
(c.f. Sell & Wilson, 1991). Second, Hamari (2017) argues
that badges function as a guidance mechanic, providing an
idea of what is expected from the group members. This is of
particular relevance when deciding on the criteria of a badge
system. If members are rewarded, e.g., for washing the
shared car, this signals to other members that washing the
car very often is a desirable behavior, which might even
have a negative ecological impact. Thus, car sharing com-
munities should be well aware of what kind of behavior they
expect from their members and what kind of rules they
want to establish for the badge system. Similar to reputation
systems, badge systems may also be used to serve as sanc-
tioning system (Jøsang et al., 2007): If a badge is presented
visibly, e.g., next to the name of a member on a list, it can
certainly act as a reward (in the case of being present) or
sanction (in the case of not being present). Thus, badges
might increase contribution as they make one’s own past
behavior visible to the other group members. Thus, by intro-
ducing a badge system, members of the community become
aware that their contributions can be traced back and might
contribute more in the future to avoid negative consequen-
ces, e.g., a bad image or a financial loss. Although previous
research underlines the motivational effects of badge systems
(e.g., Saxton, 2015; Wallis & Martinez, 2013), a badge system
might be attractive for some people, but others may be
reluctant to join as they are afraid of being publicly marked
as a free-rider. These possible effects of badge systems are
certainly an important point to be considered for fur-
ther research.
5.2. Practical implications
Car sharing communities need to carefully consider how to
organize the sharing process so that the community can be
sustained. How to enhance contributions to the shared car
is certainly an important challenge. The current research
reveals that coercive and legitimate power are relevant
mechanisms that can enhance contributions. Most interest-
ingly, the results show that when a badge system is not pre-
sent, the combination of high coercive and high legitimate
power results in the highest level of contributions. When a
badge system is present, either high coercive or high legitim-
ate power results in high levels of contributions. This sug-
gests that if car-sharing communities decide to refrain from
implementing a badge system, they need to invest in both
coercive and legitimate power, as only the combination of
both enhances contributions. If car-sharing communities on
the other hand decide to establish a badge system, they can
focus on one form of power, either coercive or legitimate
power, as contributions are high as long as one form of
power is wielded properly. Communities have to establish
rules either based on coercive or legitimate power. Those
rules can be communicated in community statutes, or via
personal communication in meetings. Newsletters or infor-
mation available directly in the car (flyer) can be used to
remind the community members about the power mecha-
nisms to enhance cooperation.
Table 2. Summary of regression analyses predicting contribution within a car
sharing community.
Contribution
Predictor variables b p
Legitimate power .04 .398
Coercive power .09 .032
Reputation system .03 .453
LPxCP –.01 .846
LPxReputation system .04 .367
CPxReputation system –.00 .992
LPxCPxReputation system –.13 .004
Implicit trust .07 .144
Reason based trust .02 .718
Control variables
Environmental consciousness .02 .791
Green consumerism .02 .765
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Car sharing communities can further use the badge sys-
tem to provide anonymous information about past behavior.
Badge systems may be a helpful tool in sharing activities, in
which no information on the past behavior of the other
members is otherwise available, especially when it comes to
low connectivity within the group of users of a shared car
or individuals engaging in car sharing for the first time.
However, as pointed out earlier, badge systems can be used
as a cue for trust, if the focus lies on informing a member
of the past behavior of others, but they may also function as
a sanctioning mechanism, if it is used to publicly honor or
dishonor individual members. Whether the badge is dis-
played anonymously or can be related back to the individual
might be crucial. Car sharing communities thus need to
carefully consider the use of badge systems.
5.3. Limitations
Although the current studies certainly have their merits, we
have identified limitations, too. A limitation of the current
research is the generalizability of the results, which is
grounded in the choice of method. The findings are based
on experiments that – as is the nature of experiments – do
not assess legit behavior in the field. Experiments address
the issue of internal validity, but examining the research
question in a laboratory experiment limits the generalizabil-
ity of our results. The sample used in the laboratory experi-
ment consisted of young and well-educated individuals, as
previous research identified this group as the main custom-
ers of sharing economy services (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2015). However, previous research has mainly focused on
users of P2P sharing platforms and thus, knowledge on par-
ticipants’ characteristics of sharing communities is still lack-
ing (e.g., income). In contrast to community gardens (e.g.,
Armstrong, 2000; Corrigan, 2011; Glover, 2004; Twiss et al.,
2003), car sharing communities are poorly researched.
Although the laboratory experiments in the current studies
enable tight control of decision environments and isolation
of the causal effect of interest (Falk & Heckman, 2009), the
gained insights should be complemented by field experi-
ments to overcome the shortcomings of the method. In
order to better represent the reality in the current studies,
participants were informed at the beginning of the experi-
ment that their payoff was calculated on the basis of contri-
butions and requests in one of the ten rounds, which was
randomly chosen at the end of the experiment. Thus, partic-
ipants’ knew beforehand that their behavior and the behav-
ior of all other community members had an impact on their
remuneration. Although this might affect participants’
behavior in the experiments, this approach was chosen
intentionally to better represent the reality as consumers’
payoff in the community depended on their decision as well
as the decision of all other members. This should reflect the
issue that members of sharing communities face: Their out-
come does not only depend on their own contribution, but
the contribution and requests of the other commu-
nity members.
6. Conclusion
The current results hold valuable implications not only for
research but are particularly relevant for the constitution of
car sharing and other sharing mobility activities in the shar-
ing economy (e.g., carpooling or bike sharing) and the legis-
lature. As more and more sharing economy activities are
organized, the question arises as to whether trust as an
organizing principle should be relied upon and whether
power mechanisms should be used to achieve cooperative
participation in a sharing community. Due to its increasing
popularity and digitalization, the sharing economy is not a
small group phenomenon of close acquaintances anymore
and therefore faces the problem of regulation. As our study
showed, power and trust in terms of a badge system plays a
role in the sharing of cars within a community.
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